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Comments
AN ILLUSION OF CAMELOT, THE VALIDITY OF
A CLAIM, AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS: THE GREAT NODULE SPECTACLE*
IMnODUCTION
In olden days, shortly before the black plague of Watergate
spread across the land, the nations of the world met together at
King Arthur's round table and, enchanted with the wonder of some
magic rocks found to be growing all over the ocean floor, stared
at a map of the world's oceans and spoke the magic words in unison,
"Common Heritage of Mankind." But something went amiss. Per-
haps the spell was wrong or perhaps not all the participants were
awake. In any event, no lightning bolts struck, no music resounded
through the halls of the United Nations, and no general feelings
of good will and brotherhood swept over the nations' representa-
tives. While some nations had visions of Camelot and world
government, others thought only of the sea as a source of new
power and wealth.
* The author would like to thank the following people for their invalu-
able help with this article: Professor E.D. Brown, University of Wales In-
stitute of Science and Technology, Faculty of Law; Professor IL Gary
Knight, Louisiana State University Law School; Professor William Lynch,
University of San Diego School of Law; Professor S. Smith, University of
Utrecht, Netherlands; and Dr. John Mero, President of Ocean Resources,
Inc., La Jolla, California.
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A decade before the concept of "common heritage" became com-
mon verbiage,1 the mysterious words "manganese nodules" were
virtually unknown. When they began to arrive on the scene, some
called them black gold; others called them burned potatoes. 2 The
thought was the same-new riches. From this began the Great
Nodule Spectacle.
The spectacle all started quite harmlessly. Over one hundred
years ago some strange, stone-like objects were found by the
British in the Atlantic Ocean.3 Bt they did not sparkle. And
while they looked like potatoes, they were quite useless for fish
and chips. So the rocks were relegated to the shelves of some
museum. Some eighty years later when it began to appear there
might exist up to 1.5 trillion tons of these rocks, an unknown
graduate student at Berkeley was asked to examine one of these
rocks to see if it was good for anything. Although his findings
were favorable, they were ignored.4
Then after some years, politicians and governmental advisors
from developing countries took over the role of public relations
agents for the rocks and transformed their image from that of a
nuisance to a cornerstone of a new economic order. In the tradi-
tion of Camelot, they then donated, at least in principle, the
magnanimous gift of these rocks to the unknowing poor people of
the world. Finally, most of the studies of the actual economic
potential of manganese nodules were kept confidential in the hands
of the mining industries. The press and general public, on the other
hand, were left to make their own calculations and conclusions with
respect to the intrinsic worth of these rocks.
The result was this. Someone in the middle of the night, still
half-asleep, came to the conclusion that 1.5 trillion tons of nodules
worth 100 dollars per ton equalled 150 trillion dollars just waiting
1. It subsequently became "common garbage," according to some writers
and industry leaders of a few countries.
2. This was the Wall Street Journal's description of manganese nodules
mentioned by Senator Metcalf, in Hearings on Amendment No. 946 to S. 1134
Before the Subcomm. on Minerals, Materials and Fuels of the Senate Comm.
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 800 (1974).
3. News release issued by Kennecott Copper Corporation, in id. at 796-56.
4. The findings of that student were that not only were deep-sea nod-
ules an apparently less expensive source of various industrially useful
metals, but that they were also highly advantageous from an ecological
standpoint. His findings, however, were greeted by the mining industry
with a "monumental and almost total lack of interest." Mero, The Great
Nodule Controversy, in LAw op THE SEA: CARACAS AND BL"zoND 343 (Pro-
ceedings of the Ninth Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute,
1975).
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for the first country with the right vacuum cleaner technology to
gather it up off the ocean floor. Developing countries, convinced
that these nodules could form the basis of a new economic order
in the world, pushed through the United Nations resolutions calling
for the establishment of an international regime (authority) to
regulate the exploitation of seabed resources. These resolutions
also declared the seabed and ocean floor to be the common heritage
of mankind.5 Today the negotiations for the establishment of this
seabed authority threaten the successful conclusion of a new law
of the sea treaty.
The revenue expected to be accumulated from deep-sea ex-
ploitation of nodules, however, cannot merely be calculated by
multiplying the number of tons of nodules by the value of metal
per ton on the assumption that there will be a market for all the
metals that can be swept up from the ocean floor. The calculation
that there exists 150 trillion dollars worth of minerals 7 just wait-
ing for the first country to come up with a big enough vacuum
cleaner that works under water fails to take into account the
extent of the market for the metals at any price and the cost of
extracting the minerals from the sea.
The gross value of the world land-based production of the metals
which can profitably be processed from manganese nodules8 in 1967
only amounted to slightly over 6 billion dollars.9 The profit from
5. See text accompanying notes 98 & 99 infra.
6. Testimony of the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance,
Carlyle E. Maw, Special Representative of the President and Chief of the
United States Delegation to the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Con-
ference before the Senate Subcommittee on Mining, Materials and Fuels,
Oct. 29, 1975, accompanying letter from Pamela L. Smith, Department of
State, to Sebastian Gibson, Nov. 4, 1975.
7. See generally Newman, The Great Ocean Mining Race $200,000,
000,000 Beneath the Sea, in Hearings on Amendment No. 946 to S. 1134,
supra note 2, at 1328-31.
8. The four most abundant minerals in manganese nodules are man-
ganese, copper, nickel and cobalt. Manganese recovery, however, is likely
to be the most expensive stage of nodule processing. Cost estimates for
various methods of nodule processing indicate that production of manganese
oxide from nodules will not be competitive with land-based production of
manganese ore. Hence, most processes under consideration do not provide
for the recovery of manganese. U.N. Doc A/AC.138/73, at 12 (1972).
9. LaQue, Prospects For and From Deep Ocean Mining, 5 MA=rn TECH-
NOLOGY Soc'y J. 14 (1971). The total gross value of world production in
1967 for copper, nickel and cobalt (the only minerals likely to be processed
mining these minerals had to be considerably less. Even using high
United Nations projections of world demand in 1980 for these
minerals' ° at 1974 prices," the gross value would still amount
only to about 20 billion dollars.' 2 To arrive at the profits for
the mining of these minerals from the sea, the cost of mining them
must yet be subtracted.
Reducing even more the profit to be made from deep-sea mining
is the fact that it is highly unlikely that such operations will totally
displace the present land-based world market of these minerals.
The profits to be shared by the mining companies with any inter-
national regime to be established will be even less if the inter-
national regime is controlled by the developing countries and takes
measures to protect the present markets and economies of the
countries which currently export these minerals.
If there are any profits left after the funds are expended to pay
administration expenses of the seabed authority,3 they will be
shared among the developing countries. Formerly the developing
countries numbered 77 and their proposals put forward to the
United Nations were recognized under the name, the Group of 77.
Today, however, the Group of 77 numbers 105. Any percentage of
the profits from seabed mining shared among these 105 States, even
on an annual basis, will simply not go very far to help the poor
people of the world. It is even more impossible that the profits to
be shared from manganese nodules will do much to adjust the rela-
tive prosperity between developed and developing countries.1 4
While manganese nodules may not do much to improve the
prosperity of developing countries, they do provide a sufficient
possibility of profits on a scale attractive to the mining industry.
from manganese nodules) in this article was estimated to be $6,000,965,000.
This estimate is even higher than the estimate for total gross value of world
production in 1968 of $5,663,400,000 found in U.N. Doe. A/AC.138/36 (1971).
10. Hearings on Amendment No. 946 to S. 1134, supra note 2, at 1132.
11. Id., at 1012.
12. Copper, 1980 need-12,147,692 short tons @ $0.68 per lb. = $16,520,
861,120; nickel, 1980 need-l,232,000 short tons @ $1.62 per lb. = $3,991,
680,000; cobalt, 1980 need-40,656 short tons @ $3.10 per lb. = $252,067,200.
Total gross value is $20,764,608,320.
13. See Mero, supra note 4, at 348:
Even if we could magically produce a $100 billion plant to produce
a $10 billion profit by stuffing 10 times the copper, nickel, cobalt,
etc., down the world consumer's throat that he is not swallowing
there still would not be sufficient funds in that $10 billion profit
to carry the bureaucracy, which would surely spring up to adin-
ister the deep-sea mining operations if the world enterprise con-
cept [the proposed International Regime] is used to produce metals
therefrom.
14. LaQue, supra note 9, at 9. See Mero, supra note 4, at 349.
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In the United States, three companies 15 are actively preparing to
mine the ocean bed, and a fourth is developing technology for
deep-sea mining on a smaller and less expensive scale than the other
companies. 10
On November 14, 1974, one of these companies, Deepsea Ventures,
Inc., filed with the Secretary of State a notice of discovery and
a claim of exclusive mining rights to a deposit of manganese nodules
lying on the seabed at a location incontrovertibly seaward of the
limits of national jurisdiction and requested diplomatic protection
and protection of their investment. 17 Because of the failure of
the third session of the United Nations Conference on Law of the
Sea to achieve progress in Geneva in 1975, Deepsea's claim, based
largely on international customary law, has assumed a new impor-
tance.
Even if a new law of the sea treaty is completed, it may take
many years before it is approved by the various States, and even
then it may not be subscribed to by a significant number of
nations.' 8 In the event of a treaty having no binding force, claims
such as Deepsea's supported by domestic legislation can be expected
to be the order of the day.
Deepsea is the first company to request diplomatic protection
from the United States government for a claim to exclusive rights
to mine an area of the seabed of the high seas. If the United States
government explicitly or implicitly gives protection to Deepsea's
claim through domestic legislation, there will be a significant
impact on international law and on the current law of the sea
negotiations.
The purpose of this Comment is to determine the validity of
15. These companies are Deepsea Ventures, Inc., Summa Corp. and Ken-
necott Copper Corp.
16. This company is Ocean Resources, Inc.
17. Deepsea Ventures, Inc.: Notice of Discovery and Claim of Exclusive
Mining Rights, and Request for Diplomatic Protection and Protection of
Investment, 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 51-65 (1975). The opinion of the
law offices of Northcutt Ely, attorneys for Deepsea Ventures, Inc., entitled
"International Law Applicable to Deepsea Mining" submitted to Deepsea
Ventures, Inc. on Nov. 14, 1974, is available at the Library of the American
Society of International Law, 2223 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington,
D.C., 20008.
18. E.D. BROWN, THE LEGAL REGnME or HYDRospAcE 81 (1971).
Deepsea's claim and any other such claim in international law, to
analyze the interests involved in the United States Government's
policy toward deep-sea mining, and to reflect on the direction inter-
national law is headed with regard to mining in the high seas.
THE VALIDITY OF DEEPSEA'S CLAIM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
One method of determining the legality of a situation or claim in
international law is to use the sources to which the International
Court of Justice would look in its determination of a dispute.
Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
states that the Court, whose function is to decide such disputes as
are submitted to it, shall, in accordance with international law,
apply:
a. [I]nternational conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice ac-
cepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law.19
Adopting a similar approach in analyzing the validity of Deep-
sea's claim, this Comment will look to international customary
law, international conventions, writers, judicial decisions, State
practice, United Nations General Assembly resolutions, and recent
sessions of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea.
Deepsea's Claim
The claim filed with the Secretary of State by Deepsea is
for exclusive mining rights to a deposit of manganese nodules
on the ocean floor and is accompanied by a request for diplomatic
protection and protection of its investment. 20 The deposit is
located on the seabed in the Pacific Ocean in water depths of
2,300 to 5,000 meters, more than 1,000 kilometers from the nearest
island and more than 1,300 kilometers seaward of the edge of the
nearest continental margin. It is beyond the limits of seabed juris-
diction claimed by any State, thus the overlying waters are incon-
trovertably high seas. Deepsea's claim is to an area of approxi-
mately 60,000 square kilometers 21 with the "exclusive rights to
19. I.C.J. STAT. art. 38, para. 1.
20. See note 17 supra.
21. This rather large area, Deepsea asserts, is for purposes of develop-
ment and evaluation and would be reduced by Deepsea to 30,000 square
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develop, evaluate and mine the Deposit and to take, use, and sell
all of the manganese nodules in, and the minerals derived,
therefrom."22
The cost of prospecting, exploration, design and testing efforts
required to identify and evaluate the potential of the deposit has
already been approximately 20 million dollars. Deepsea estimates
the cost of its scheduled development and further exploration and
evaluation of the deposit over the next three years will be between
22 and 30 million dollars. This does not include the costs of produc-
tion mining equipment, ships, terminals, or processing plants.
These latter costs are estimated to exceed 120 million dollars and are
scheduled by Deepsea to commence at the end of the three-year
period of further development and evaluation of the deposit now
in progress. 23
Public notice of Deepsea's claim has been made through news-
papers in the major countries of the world. In an effort to seek
support and diplomatic protection from the United States govern-
ment for its claim, Deepsea has also sent copies of the claim filed
with the Department of State to various Senate committees and
United States government officials. 24 There are, however, many
considerations involved in the State Department's decision whether
to give support, one of which is the validity of Deepsea's claim
under international law.
International Customary Law Prior to the Continental Shelf
Doctrine
In determining the validity under international law of Deepsea's
claim today, it is valuable to study the treatment of past claims
kilometers 15 years after the date notice was filed with the United States
Secretary of State, or upon commencement of commercial production from
the deposit, whichever occurs first. The claim also states that the general
area of the deposit was identified in August of 1964 by the predecessor in
interest of Deepsea, and that the deposit was discovered by Deepsea on
August 31, 1969. Notice of Discovery, supra note 17, at 52.
22. Id. at 53.
23. Deepsea hopes to commence commercial production of the deposit
within 15 years at an initial rate of approximately 1.35 million wet metric
tons of manganese nodules per year, which rate may be expanded accord-
ing to market conditions to as much as 4 million wet metric tons per year.
The company intends to process the nodules at a land-based processing
plant. Id. at 60, 62.
24. Id. at 63-65.
to the seabed prior to the date such areas were claimed to belong
to the coastal State under the Continental Shelf Doctrine. Before
the Doctrine of the Continental Shelf emerged as a positive rule
of international law, the seabed beyond the limits of national juris-
diction embraced the abyssal ocean floor as well as the continental
margin up to the seaward limit of the coastal State's territorial
sea. Indeed, scientists were not even aware of the geomorphic dif-
ference between the continental shelf and deeper seabed areas until
the late nineteenth century. It was not until the middle of the
twentieth century that this geomorphic difference was recognized
in international law, and a distinction was made between the
continental shelf and the deeper submarine areas.25
Prior to the emergence of the Doctrine of the Continental Shelf,
national jurisdiction over the seabed generally extended only to the
outer limit of the territorial sea. However, in some areas beyond
the territorial sea a number of States acquired sovereignty or ex-
clusive rights to seabed resources by exploiting the seabed in these
areas and excluding other States from doing the same. Although
there was some disagreement among writers as to whether the legal
nature of the seabed beyond territorial waters was res communis
or res nullius, there was no suggestion that the legal nature of
the continental shelf, margin or rise was different than that of the
rest of the ocean floor. 20
It was not until advances in offshore petroleum technology made
drilling beyond territorial waters feasible that States began to claim
sovereign rights to vast areas of the continental shelf. These claims
gave rise to the Doctrine of the Continental Shelf which extended
national jurisdiction to include seabed areas beyond territorial
waters that had previously been appropriated by exploitation and
force.2 7
International law prior to the Doctrine of the Continental Shelf
did not distinguish between the shelf and deeper parts of the sea-
bed. It would thus appear that State practice on the continental
shelf prior to the Doctrine, as well as State practice beyond the
continental shelf, can be looked to as evidence of the law applicable
to the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction today.
An argument can be made, however, that when the Continental
Shelf Doctrine was adopted, it was adopted under the condition,
inter alia, that the right of the coastal State to appropriate
25. See 1 D.P. O'CoNNELL, LEATONAL LAW 571-72 (1965).
26. Id.
27. Id.
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resources of the seabed for its exclusive use was limited to some
distance from the coast. From this it might then be assumed that
the nations who formulated the concept of the continental shelf
must have intended that the resources of the area beyond would
not be subject to exclusive appropriation. 28
However, it is unlikely that such an intention can be assumed
or is capable of ascertainment. Moreover, it is just as arguable that
such a consequence does not logically follow from the emergence
of the Continental Shelf Doctrine. Prior to the Doctrine, coastal
States claiming jurisdiction and exclusive rights to seabed resources
exhibited no signs of self-restraint in exploiting the seabed. 29
Today, any belief that the coastal States' exclusive rights are
limited to the marine resources on the continental shelf has fallen
by the wayside as a consensus develops for the acceptance of a 200-
mile exclusive economic zone.30 This zone, if adopted, will give
exclusive rights to the coastal State of the marine resources of the
seabed out to 200 nautical miles from the coast regardless of where
the continental shelf ends.
Furthermore, article 2 (2) of the 1958 Convention on the Con-
tinental Shelf specifically states: "The rights of the coastal State
over the Continental Shelf do not depend on occupation, effective
or notional, or any express proclamation." Rather, the Continental
Shelf Doctrine as interpreted by the International Court of Justice
in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,3 1 rests predominantly
on a supposed right of the coastal State to the natural prolonga-
tion of its territory into the sea. It would seem, therefore, that
the importance of past claims to the seabed of the high seas made
on other grounds such as occupation are in no way affected by the
Continental Shelf Doctrine. Indeed, the customary international
law surrounding these past claims is applicable to Deepsea's claim
today.3 A
28. Letter from Professor H. Gary Knight to Sebastian Gibson, Oct.
22, 1975.
29. See text accompanying notes 33-34 infra.
30. See Statement of John Norton Moore in Hearing on Achievements of
the Geneva Session of the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference
Before the Subcomm. on Oceans and International Environment of the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 7 (1975).
31. [1969] I.C.5. 3.
32. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the International Court of
The rights exercised by States on the shelf were recognized long
before the Doctrine of the Continental Shelf was ever considered.
As early as 1758 the pearl fisheries of Bahrein and Ceylon were
recognized as lawful property of those States.83 Prior to the emer-
gence of the Continental Shelf Doctrine, numerous States exercised
jurisdiction or exclusive rights over the seabed resources in waters
beyond the limits of territorial jurisdiction.8 4
The Status of the Seabed Under the High Seas and the Basis for
Sts Appropriation
The status of the seabed under the high seas is important in two
respects. First, the basis of seabed appropriation is dependent upon
the status of the seabed and the criteria for assessing the validity
of claims. Second, the applicability of the 1958 Convention on the
High Seas to seabed appropriation may also be dependent upon the
seabed's status.
Opinions of writers and United Nations Conference delegates
have been divided concerning the status of the seabed under the
high seas. A few authorities in the past have taken the view that
the surface of the seabed beyond the waters of territorial jurisdic-
tion has the same legal status as the high seas.25 Under this view
the seabed is merely the bottom of the sea and its use is free to any
State. Exclusive rights would be obtainable, if at all, only through
the acquiescence of all the other States. Other writers have consid-
Justice stated that the Truman Proclamation of 1945 was the "starting
point" of the Continental Shelf Doctrine. [1969] LC.J. 34. While the
Truman Proclamation of 1945 was not the first instrument to declare rights
over continental shelf areas, the court felt it had a special status. Similarly,
the report of the Special Master in United States v. Maine, concluded that
a new rule of international law was initiated by the Truman Proclamation.
Report of the Special Master, United States v. Maine at 79-80, No. 35 (U.S.
Oct. 1973). This Comment, therefore, will consider State practice on the
continental shelf prior to the date of the Truman Proclamation.
33. Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law, in
CLAssics or ANTEmATiONAL LAw 107 (C. Fenwick transl. 1916). See T.
FuLTON, THE SOVERmGNTE OF mE SEA 696-98 (1911).
34. Some of these States included Algeria (coral), Australia (pearl), the
Bahamas (sponge), British Honduras (sponge), Ceylon (chank and pearl),
Cuba (sponge), England (oyster), Egypt (sponge), France (oyster), Greece(sponge), Ireland (oyster), Italy (coral), Japan (coral), Libya (sponge),
Mexico (pearl), Panama (pearl), the Persian Gulf States (pearl), the Phil-
ippines (pearl), Sicily (coral), Tunisia (coral and sponge), Turkey(sponge) and Venezuela (pearl). Testimony of the Honorable Phillip C.
Jessup, in Report of the Special Master, United States v. Maine at 173-230,
No. 35 (U.S. Oct. 1973).
35. C. CoLo1 vros, INTERNATiONAL LAW OF THE SEA 67 (6th ed. 1967); 1
G. GinEL, LE DRorr INTE RNATONAL PUBLIc Dr, LA MEm 498-501 (1932).
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ered the seabed not merely as part of the sea, but as territory cov-
ered by the sea, and thus res nullius.5 6 "These writers argued that
sovereignty can be acquired over the seabed, as it may be over
land, by 'effective occupation' without the acquiescence of other
States and subject only to no unreasonable interference in the free
use of the high seas above."3 7
The rationale for keeping the oceans free from occupation by any
State is that the oceans are an international highway which con-
nects distant lands and secures freedom of communication and
commercial intercourse between States separated by the sea. There
is no reason for extending this freedom of the open sea to the sub-
soil beneath its bed.38 While most legal writers have long assumed
that sovereignty or exclusive rights with respect to areas of the
seabed of the high seas are capable of acquisition, they have been
plagued by what should be the criteria in determining whether such
rights have indeed been acquired.
Oppenheim recognized that while immemorial usage was often
present in these cases, it was not required in order to make valid
the claims to exclusive seabed rights beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction. Instead he found it more in accord with State
practice to recognize that "as a matter of law, a State may by
strictly local occupation acquire sovereignty and property in the
36. 1 P. FAUCHILLE TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 19 (1925); C.
HURST, ANNUA E 160 (1925); 2 H.A. SivT, GREAT BPiTAIn AND THE LAW
OF NATIONS 122 (1935); 1 J. WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW pt. 1, at 187-
88 (1904).
37. Waldock, The Legal Basis of Claims to the Continental Shelf, 36
Gaorius SOCIETY TRANSACTIONS 115, 116-17 (1950).
38. O'Connell, Sedentary Fisheries and the Australian Continental Shelf,
49 Am. J. INTPL LAW 185 (1955). Oppenhehn argued as well that there was
a distinct difference between the law applicable to the seabed of the open
sea and the subsoil beneath it on the one hand, and the waters of the open
sea on the other.
There has been a tendency in the past to assume that the surface
of the bed upon which the open sea rests must be likened in legal
condition to the waters of the open sea themselves. But when
regard is had to the arguments which brought about the abandon-
ment of the former claims to occupy the water of the open sea,
. . . and the argument that the freedom of the waters of the open
sea is essential to the freedom of intercourse between States (the
main practical reason), it must be conceded that these reasons do
not apply to the surface of the sea-bed or to its subsoil. L. OPPEN-
nnv, INTEmNATIONAL LAW § 287bb, at 628 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht
1962).
surface of the sea-bed" so long as that in doing so there was no
interference with freedom of navigation.39
Professor Waldock concluded that once exclusive rights to seabed
resources were recognized by the international community as valid
in law, they belonged to the claimant States by reason of their
actual enjoyment of the areas and particular claims to exclusive
jurisdiction.40  In agreement, the Special Master in United States
v. Maine held Professor Waldock's. conclusion to be an accurate
summation of international law on the subject.41
In cases where exclusive State rights in sedentary fisheries have
been recognized, the existence of long usage is best viewed as an
evidentiary factor justifying the appropriation, and not as the basis
itself.42 At the same time, there has been present in all these
cases an element of effective usage, and on this basis other writers
have found "occupation" to be the legal basis for such rights.
More recently, a number of writers, 3 have adopted a more logi-
cal approach to this rather sterile dispute over "an awkward corner
of international law that has tended hitherto perhaps to remain
too near to its private law origins. ' 44  Speaking of historical
consolidation of title, Professor de Visscher writes:
Proven long use, which is its foundation, merely represents a
complex of interests and relations which in themselves have the
effect of attaching a territory or an expanse of sea to a given state.
It is these interests and relations, varying from one case to another,
and not the passage of a fixed term, unknown in any event to inter-
national law, that are taken into direct account by the Judge to
decide in concreto on the existence or nonexistence of a consolida-
tion by historic titles.4 5
Along these same lines, Professor Schwarzenberger has commented:
"The more absolute a title becomes, the more apparent becomes
the multiplicity of its roots. In its movement from relativity to
absolute validity, it undergoes a process of historical consolida-
tion., 4 6
A realistic approach to the subject must also recognize that the
39. L. OPPENHErm , INTE RNATIoNAL LAW 575-76 (7th ed. 1948).
40. Waldock, supra note 37, at 118.
41. Report of the Special Master, United States v. Maine at 68-69, No. 35
(U.S. Oct. 1973).
42. 1 D.P. O'CoNNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 516-17 (2d ed. 1970).
43. See, e.g., E.D. BROWN, supra note 18, at 83-85.
44. R.Y. JENNINGS, THE AcQuisiTION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
26 (1963).
45. C. DEVISScHER, THoms ET R~LTS EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
200-203 (Corbett transl. 1957).
46. G. ScHwAnzzEsNRGE, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 125 (1967).
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two most important and basic elements in establishing title were
power and indifference. In the few cases where indifference to
claims of submarine areas was not involved, power to exclude chal-
lengers made these claims effective.4 7 The use of force today,
however, would be allowable only in the most extreme circum-
stances, such as in self-defense to protect goods or territory already
acquired. 48
As Professor Brown has stated, "the search for the correct basis
of submarine titles in either 'occupation' or 'prescription' seems
rather futile. '49 It is more rational to recognize that in the
acquisition of exclusive rights to submarine areas today, effective
control along with acts of acquiescence, recognition, and lack of pro-
test together constitute the "complex of interests and relations"
which will give credence to claims. 50 Thus as a practical matter,
the acquiescence by the international community to a claim such
as that of Deepsea's is of paramount importance. Where there is
protest instead of acquiescence by the international community,
such a claim must fail.
Effective Occupation
International judicial decisions have held that in the acquisition
of sovereignty over land, occupation of the territory must be effec-
tive under international standards. Deepsea's claim is for exclusive
rights to the resources of the seabed and subsoil; it is not to sover-
eignty. Whether the same standards and case precedents relating
to sovereignty are equally applicable to claims of exclusive rights
cannot be stated with any assurance. Therefore, caution must be
taken in applying the international decisions to Deepsea's claim.
47. A factor which allowed exercise of this power was the fact that all
such claims to sedentary fisheries were made by the coastal State in each
case. The question thus arises whether these exclusive rights were acquired
on the basis of that reason, or on some other legal basis. Waldock wrote
on this point: "It is true that such claims to resources of the sea-bed or
subsoil were made only by coastal States but they were justified as acts
of occupation, not as the natural rights of coastal States." Waldock, supra
note 37, at 118. Contra Biggs, Deepsea's Adventures: Grotius Revisited, 9
INT'L LAW. 271, 278 (1975).
48. See U.N. CHART=R arts. 39, 51.
49. E.D. BROWN, supra note 18, at 84.
50. Id.
The degree of occupation required to constitute an effective occu-
pation giving territorial sovereignty over an area has been held to
vary with the susceptibility of the area to occupation.5 1 Further-
more, in instances where States acquired sovereign or exclusive
rights to sedentary fisheries in seabed areas beyond national juris-
diction, there was very little physical occupation of the seabed and
minimal protection of the deposits against other States. Neverthe-
less, titles to the deposits were generally recognized in interna-
tional law as belonging to the State exercising exclusive rights
over the deposit.
Under these variable international standards, Deepsea might
satisfy the criteria for effective occupation. Indeed, the activities
51. There are three leading international decisions which show the degree
of occupation required to constitute an effective occupation giving territorial
sovereignty. The Island of Palmas Case, 2 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 829(1928), Hague Court Reports 2d (Scott) 83 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928) involved
a dispute between the United States and the Netherlands over title to
Palmas, an island between the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies. By
agreement, the United States and the Netherlands submitted the dispute to
the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The arbitrator held that the control
exercised by the Dutch East India Company was a sufficient exercise of
State authority to vest title to Palmas in the Netherlands. Observing the
degree of authority which had been required in other cases to establish
sovereignty, the arbitrator concluded that the authority required to be
exercised may vary with the nature of the area in question.
The Clipperton Island Arbitration, 2 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 1105(1949), 26 Amv. J. IT'L LAW 390 (1932) involved a dispute between 'France
and Mexico over an uninhabited coral reef off the coast of Mexico in the
Pacific Ocean. King Victor Emanuel HI of Italy, acting as arbitrator, held
that two acts done by French authorities over a 39-year period-a naval
reconnaissance and the granting of a concession to exploit guano-were suf-
ficient in this case to constitute effective occupation and give title to the
island to France. The arbitrator established a flexible test to determine
"occupation." By this test, occupation giving title is accomplished when
the occupying State reduces the territory to its possession and takes steps
to exercise exclusive authority. In ordinary cases, a legal authority must
be established and respected in the territory. Where, however, the territory
is uninhabited from the first moment the occupying State makes its appear-
ance there, possession and occupation is accomplished.
The Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case, P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53(1933), 3 Hudson World Court Rpts. 148 (1938) involved a dispute between
Denmark and Norway over unsettled areas of Greenland. The case arose
from Denmark's request of the Permanent Court of International Justice
to declare unlawful Norway's proclaimed right to certain parts of Eastern
Greenland in 1931. The court held that, given the arctic and inaccessible
character of the unsettled parts of Greenland, the display of Danish author-
ity over settled areas, the intention of Denmark to act as a sovereign over
all areas, and an assurance by. a Norwegian Foreign Minister that Danish
sovereignty would meet with no difficulties on the part of Norway, Den-
mark's claim to the unsettled areas was sufficiently supported. The court's
rationale was that, particularly in thinly populated or unsettled countries,
very little is required in the way of actual exercise of sovereign rights, pro-
vided that another State cannot make a superior claim.
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of a sole nodule-recovery ship, exploration and evaluation of the
deposit, reasonable diligence in exploiting the deposit and an inten-
tion to exercise its rights over the claimed area, reasonable in size,
might be held to constitute an effective occupation in light of the
inaccessible character of the territory. Again, however, it must be
recognized that effective occupation without the acquiescence of the
international community would not be sufficient in itself to give
exclusive rights to the occupier.
Rights of Private Corporations and Individuals Under International
Law
Even if it is found that the seabed could be effectively occupied
under international standards, there remains the question of
whether a private corporation such as Deepsea, apart from its sov-
ereign State, can acquire exclusive rights to natural resources in
seabed areas beyond national jurisdiction. In the past, inter-
national law adopted a strict orthodox rule that only States were
subjects of international law, and were capable of acquiring
international rights.
Whoever ill-treats a citizen indirectly injures the State, which must
protect that citizen. The sovereign of the injured citizen must
avenge the deed and, if possible, force the aggressor to give full
satisfaction or punish him, since otherwise the citizen will not ob-
tain the chief end of civil society, which is protection.52
In many international tribunal cases involving injuries to persons,
the tribunals have given recognition to the orthodox theory but
have treated the injury in question as essentially an injury to the
individual rather than as an injury to the sovereign. 53
Although awards by international tribunals for injuries to
persons invariably have been justified on the grounds that the
injury was to the person's State, the amounts of awards always
have been determined on the basis of the amount of damage suf-
fered by the person. As Philip C. Jessup has observed, if injury
to the person's State were the true basis of damages, "the measure
52. E. VATmE, supra note 33, at 136.
53. See, e.g., Administrative Decision V of the Mixed Claims Commission(United States and Germany 1924), in A mnaNsmATIv DECISIONS AND
OPINIONS OF A GENERAL NATURE AND OPINIoNs iN INDIVIDuAL LusirANiA
CLAnims AND OTHER CASES TO JuNE 30, 1925, at 192 (1925).
of damages to be paid for an injury would vary with the impor-
tance of the role played by the injured individual in the life of
the State of which he is a citizen."54  In practice, international
tribunals have not considered the importance of the individual to
his State to be a relevant factor in computing awards.
There is considerable evidence in both practice and theory that
the international legal personality of the individual is becoming
recognized. 55 The fact that an individual or corporation usually
lacks procedural capacity to assert rights before most international
tribunals does not signify that he is not a subject of the law or
that the rights in question are vested exclusively in the individual's
State which possesses the capacity to bring suit. 5 In national
courts, for instance, it has long been recognized that individuals
and corporations may enforce international legal rights. 1
Perhaps partly because the individual in most States has no legal
right under the domestic law to compel his foreign office to press
his claim in an international forum,58 the trend of modern develop-
ments of international law is the granting of procedural capacity
to individuals for the protection of certain well-defined rights.50
Recognition of individuals as subjects of international law has
been furthered in the United Nations, and even more so in Europe.
The Charter of the United Nations declared the determination of
the peoples of the United Nations to reaffirm their faith in human
rights. On December 10, 1948, the General Assembly adopted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The meaning and intent
of this document is clear. It spells out the human rights that are
considered fundamental and then provides that everyone has the
right to an effective remedy by his national tribunals for acts
violating the fundamental rights granted him by constitution or
by law.0
In Europe, the Declaration was quickly implemented. On
November 4, 1950, the Council of Europe adopted the European
54. P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 9 (1948).
55. See W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 461, 463-65 (3d ed. 1971).
56. M. SORENSEN, MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 265-66 (1968).
57. W. BISHOP, supra note 55, at 464-65.
58. Id. at 463.
59. M. SORENSEN, supra note 56, at 266. This trend has been noted by
numerous legal scholars. The proposition that individuals are subjects of
international law, and as such have international rights and duties, has
formed the basis for numerous legal books. See, e.g., P. J.Ssup, A MODERN
LAW OF NATIONS (2d ed. 1968).
60. SIR L. SCARMAN, ENGLISH LAw-THE N w DnVIENSION 21 (The Ham-
lyn Lectures, 26th Series 1974).
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Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. This Convention includes within its provisions most of
the human rights declared by the United Nations to be fundamen-
tal and creates machinery for their enforcement, a Commission of
Human Rights and a Court of Human Rights. 61
One of the significant features of the Convention is that it affords
an opportunity, albeit limited, for an individual person to seek
redress. He may make petition, through the Council of Europe,
to the Commission, if the party State against whom he petitions
has recognized the competence of the Commission to receive such
petitions. Thereafter an individual cannot take his case to the
court, but the Commission can do so for him. 2
While the trend is to recognize the procedural capacity of the
individual to the protection of certain well-defined rights in inter-
national law, it is still the general rule today that an individual
or corporation of the United States must rely on the Department
of State to enforce its rights and claims against other nations.
However, this trend toward the recognition of individual rights in
international law does lend authority to the view generally that
the individual, and perhaps the corporation as well, does have rights
and duties in international law. Whether one of these rights is the
right to claim exclusive rights with regard to territory not within
the jurisdiction of any State must be determined by looking to State
practice.
State Practice
One example where the United States State Department has
afforded protection to the claim of a private United States com-
61. Id. at 13.
62. Id. The Common Market has also furthered individual rights in in-
ternational law. The European Communities Treaties for the Common
Market provide a Court of Justice with the jurisdiction to quash any
measure taken by the Communities' Council of Ministers or the European
Commission which is shown to have been ultra vires. The Court also hasjurisdiction to quash any measure which constitutes an infringement of the
procedural rules of the Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its applica-
tion or misuse of its powers. This jurisdiction to quash can be invoked
by any natural or legal person if the decision is of a direct and individual
concern to him, as well as by the Council, Commission or any member
State. Further, under articles 175 and 215, it would appear that an ag-
grieved person, should he be successful, would be able to obtain monetary
compensation along with the quashing of the illegal measure. Id. at 23.
pany to natural resources beyond national jurisdiction is in the
case of Spitzbergen Island. In this instance, when the American
company acquired rights on Spitzbergen, the island was considered
by all the States with interests in the island to be terra nulius, i.e.,
not subject to the jurisdiction of any State.63
The history of Spitzbergen goes back to the late 16th and early
17th centuries when English and Dutch whalers discovered the
archipelago and main island of Spitzbergen, and established exten-
sive summer settlements there. In 1614, King James I of England
proclaimed the main island to be annexed to England and named
it King James his Newland.6 4 The Dutch contested this claim. In
later years after the fishery for whales ceased, the two States'
territorial pretensions were not pressed, but to their claims were
added those of the Danish, Russian, German and Norwegian. Ulti-
mately the claims led to a diplomatic standoff. However, each
country was prepared to accept the status of the archipelago to
be terra nullius, provided all other interested parties did the
same.6 5
The United States expressed a special interest in the islands, due
to the business interests of the Arctic Coal Company, a Boston en-
terprise. In 1906, the Arctic Coal Company had purchased from a
Norwegian company a coal-bearing tract on which the Norwegian
company had filed a claim with both the Norwegian Foreign Office
and Department of the Interior. Three other tracts were purchased
by officers of the Arctic Coal Company and were worked by the
company. The same year, the Arctic Coal Company filed with the
State Department a claim of exclusive rights to all coal within these
tracts. Importantly, Norway, like Russia, the United States and
other interested States, did not press territorial claims, but agreed
that the archipelago was terra nutius.16
In the decade before World War I, Norway attempted to raise
support, through diplomatic activity, for a regime recognizing the
archipelago's status as no man's land, but giving Russia, Norway
and Sweden a more powerful voice in the islands' administration.
However, after World War I, the nine interested States decided
to recognize Norwegian sovereignty over the islands, in the 1920
Treaty of Paris. The treaty also recognized and preserved the estab-
63. Testimony of Professor L.F.E. Goldie, in Hearings on S. 1134 Before
the Subcomm. on Minerals, Materials and Fuels of the Senate Comm.
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 487, 507 (1973).
64. Id. at 505.
65. Id. at 50G.
66. Id. at 507.
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lished rights of citizens of the signatory states to exploit their coal
and other mineral holdings on Spitzbergen. These rights were also
recognized in the years and decades before the Treaty was signed.67
The State Department accepted the Arctic Coal Company's regis-
tration of their claim with the United States as conferring the titles
claimed through possession, posting notices, active working and
registration. The United States government also protected this
claim in its policy statements and letters to the Norwegian authori-
ties. This position by the United States was emphasized by Presi-
dent Taft in his message to the Congress of December 7, 1909. With
respect to an invitation to participate in the establishing of an inter-
national regime to govern Spitzbergen, he stated that the United
States had accepted the invitation "under the further reservation
that all interests in those islands already vested should be protected
and that there should be equality of opportunity for the future."68
The 1920 Treaty of Paris offered to the interested States a means
by which they were able to quitclaim their title interests in the
islands to Norway, while reserving inviolate the properties and
rights which their citizens antecedently enjoyed. This Treaty and
the entire Spitzbergen episode provide a useful precedent of protec-
tion by the United States government of international rights
acquired by a United States corporation in a terra nuflius.
The State Department also afforded protection of claims by
United States companies to natural resources on Guano Islands
which, at the time, were not within the national jurisdiction of any
State. In 1856, Congress passed the Guano Islands Act,69 which
provides that whenever a United States citizen discovers a nonoccu-
pied island which has on it a deposit of guano (sea-bird manure)
the island may, at the discretion of the President be considered as
appertaining to the United States.70 The discoverer may in turn
be allowed to possess at the pleasure of Congress, the exclusive
right of occupying the island for the purpose of obtaining guano.71
The exclusive right to exploit the deposits of guano on islands
67. Id. at 506-07.
68. Annual Message of the President to Congress, 7 December 1909, 9
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 9, 13 (1914).
69. 48 U.S.C. §§ 1411-14 (1970).
70. Id. § 1411.
71. Id. § 1414.
subject to the Act was based on the discovery of the actual guano
deposit on the island.7 2 However, the procedure by which the
discoverer perfected his right to exploit the guano was based on
discovery of the island. After discovery, notice was to be given by
the discoverer to the Department of State describing the location
of the island, showing that possession of the island was taken in
the name of the United States, and furnishing evidence that the
island was not in the possession or occupation of any other govern-
ment or citizens of any other government.1 3
The decision to annex a guano island and/or recognize the
exclusive exploitation rights of its discoverer was within the discre-
tion of the State Department, acting on the President's behalf.74
Effective occupation of the island in question and possession of the
guano deposit, and the absence of superior claims by contesting
States, appear to have been the primary factors in the State Depart-
ment's determination of whether to grant diplomatic protection.75
On the basis of this precedent as well as that of Spitzbergen, it
can be argued that at least under United States law, and perhaps
in international law as well if there is to be found similar prece-
dent in the domestic law of other States, a private company such
as Deepsea has the right to claim in the name of the United States
exclusive rights to or title in land territory not the subject of
national jurisdiction by another State. At the discretion of Con-
gress, the claimant company may then be given exclusive rights
to the resources of the territory.
International Convention Law
It is not sufficient to analyze the validity of Deepsea's claim
merely under international customary law. International conven-
tion law should, where relevant, also be applied to the claim.
72. Id. § 1411.
73. Id. § 1412.
74. Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 217 (1890).
75. The Department of State defended the claims of United States na-
tionals to guano deposits on the following islands: Ayes Island (against
Venezuela), Christmas Island (against Great Britain), the Lobos Island
(against Peru), the Mongos and Los Islands (against Venezuela), Navassa
Island (against Haiti), Quito Sereno Island (against Columbia) and the
Serrano Keys (against Great Britain). The Department of State declined
to espouse the claims of United States nationals with respect to other
islands where it considered a foreign government's claim to be superior.
For a detailed description of United States' practice with respect to the
Guano Islands Act, see 1 J. MOORE, IN MATIONAL LAW DIGEST 556-80
(1906).
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As already demonstrated, 76 the general opinion of legal writers
is that the status of the seabed is res nullius and thus different
from the res communis status of the high seas. As res nullius, the
seabed is not part of the sea, but is territory merely covered by
the sea and thus capable of acquisition. If it is true that the status
of the seabed is different from the high seas, it is arguable that
the 1958 Convention on the High Seas 77 does not apply to the
seabed and subsoil under the high seas.
However, the Convention on the High Seas was drafted by the
International Law Commission, which was established by the United
Nations General Assembly in 1947 for the purpose of codifying
existing international customary law. Therefore, in determining
the applicability of this Convention to the seabed, it should be taken
into account the extent to which the high seas have been considered
in international customary law as encompassing the seabed and sub-
soil regardless of their res communis or res nullius status. The
concern of the drafters of this Convention with seabed mining as
a possible freedom of the high seas under international customary
law78 would suggest that the High Seas Convention should be con-
sidered in the analysis of the legal validity of Deepsea's claim to
exclusive rights with respect to an area of the seabed.
In interpreting article two, which is concerned with the freedoms
of the high seas, it should also be considered to what extent ex-
ploitation of the high seas was considered to be a freedom of the
high seas prior to the Convention. While the Convention on its
own force is binding on all nations which have ratified it or
accepted it, the specific provisions of the Convention are also bind-
ing on all nations to the extent they are recognized as embodying
the customary law of the high seas.
Article two of the Convention of the High Seas (1958) states:
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly
purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom
of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by
these articles and by the other rules of international law. It com-
prises, inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal States:
76. See text accompanying notes 35-38 supra.
77. Article 1 states that the Convention deals only with "all parts of the
sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of
a State."
78. See text accompanying notes 79-81 infra.
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general
principles of international law, shall be exercised by all States with
reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise
of the freedom of the high seas.
Although freedom to exploit the seabed beneath the high seas
is not specifically mentioned in article two, the insertion of the term
"inter alia" prior to the enumeration of -the four listed freedoms,
and the phrase, "[t] hese freedoms, and others which are recognized
by the general principles of international law. . . ," indicate that
there are additional freedoms of the high seas not specifically
enumerated in article two. In the records of the International Law
Commission, there is evidence that the Commission did in fact con-
sider exploitation of the seabed and subsoil beyond national juris-
diction to be one of these additional freedoms.7 9
In the commentary on its draft of article 27, which became article
two of the High Seas Convention, the International Law Comis-
sion indicated that the "list of freedoms of the high seas contained
in this article is not restrictive," and recognized that freedom of
the high seas includes the "freedom to explore or exploit the sub-
soil of the high seas."8 0  The commentary explained that the
reason the Commission did not make specific mention of the free-
dom to explore or exploit the subsoil of the high seas was that
"apart from the case of the exploitation or exploration of the soil
or subsoil of a continental shelf ... exploitation (of the high seas
soil or subsoil) had not yet assumed sufficient practical importance
to justify special regulation.""' Thus, while the Convention on the
High Seas does not expressly state that exploitation of the seabed
and subsoil of the high seas is a freedom of the high seas, the open
textured language of article two and the travaux preparatoires to
the Convention suggest that if there were any other freedoms in
international customary law which were included in the article's
codification of the existing law, this is likely to be one of them.
Assuming that the freedom to explore or exploit the seabed and
subsoil is an article two freedom of the high seas "recognized by
the general principles of international law," the question must be
79. [1955] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. Coxm'x 21-22, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1955/
Add. 1 (1960); [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. Colmvw'N 278, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/
1956/Add. 1 (1957).
80. [1956] 2 YB. INr'L L. Comn'x 278, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1956/
Add. 1 (1957).
81. Id.
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answered whether it would not be inconsistent with this freedom
to claim exclusive rights to areas of the seabed and subsoil in order
to exercise this freedom. Put another way, does the freedom to
exploit the seabed include the power to exclude others from exer-
cising their freedom in a certain area?
Article two states that no State may validly purport to subject
any part of the high seas to its sovereignty. While Deepsea is not
claiming sovereignty over the area, the claim to exclusive rights
might be considered to be sufficiently analogous to a claim of sov-
ereignty to fall within the realm of exclusivity the article prohibits.
While the Department of State has repeatedly reaffirmed the
rights of Americans under existing international law to explore and
exploit the seabed of the ocean floor beyond the national jurisdic-
tion of any State, it has only encouraged deep-sea mining to proceed
under the doctrine of freedom of the high seas.8 2 Mindful of the
negotiations in progress for a new law of the sea treaty, the United
States has not yet suggested that this freedom includes the right
to claim exclusive rights to areas of the seabed.
The position of the State Department with respect to deep ocean
mining was most recently stated by Under Secretary of State,
Carlyle E. Maw, Special Representative of the President and Chief
of the United States Delegation to the Third United Nations Law
of the Sea Conference. In testimony before the Senate Sub-
committee on Minerals, Materials and Fuels on October 29, 1975,
Mr. Maw stated:
I wish to reiterate our position that there is no impediment under
existing international law to any nation or individual undertaking
deep seabed mining, provided that mining operations are under-
taken with reasonable regard to the interests of others in their exer-
cise of high seas freedoms. We encourage private investors to
82. See, e.g., Letter from John R. Stevenson, Legal Advisor, Dep't of
State, to Senator Lee Metcalf, Jan. 16, 1970, in Hearings on Issues Related
to Establishment of Seaward Boundary of United States Outer Continental
Shelf Before the Special Subcomm. on the Outer Continental Shelf of the
Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.,
at 210 (1970); Testimony of John Norton Moore, Counselor on International
Law for the State Dep't, in 1973 Hearings on S. 1134, supra note 63, at 247:
"It is certainly the position of the United States that the mining of the deep
seabed is a high-seas freedom and I think that would be a freedom today
under international law .... "
develop their technology and to begin mining when they are
ready.8 3
Nevertheless, the State Department's statement with respect to
the claim of Deepsea refuses recognition of the claim, although it
again stresses the importance of the freedom of the high seas
doctrine.
The Department of State does not grant or recognize exclusive
mining rights to the mineral resources of an area of the seabed
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
The appropriate means for the development of the law of the sea
is the Third United Nations Conference on Law of the Sea and not
unilateral claims. The United States supports the achievement of
a widely acceptable and comprehensive law of the sea treaty in
1975 that would include a regime and machinery for the explora-
tion for and exploitation of the mineral resources of the deep sea-
bed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
The position of the United States Government on deep ocean
mining pending the outcome of the Law of the Sea Conference is
that the mining of the seabed beyond the limits of national juris-
diction may proceed as a freedom of the high seas under existing
international law.8 4
Article two of the 1958 High Seas Convention states that the
freedoms of the high seas "shall be exercised by all states with
reasonable regard to the interests of other states." Therefore, the
question which arises is whether it would be a reasonable use of
the high seas to claim exclusive rights to areas of the high seas
for deep-sea mining3 5
To facilitate the interpretation of article two, a theory of reason-
able use of the high seas has been developed in international law.
This theory was first developed in an article defending United
States nuclear testing in the Pacific Ocean as a reasonable use of
the high seas.8 6 McDougal and Schlei, the authors of the article,
analyzed the range of unilateral claims which have been honored
by the international community. They found that if a claimant
83. Testimony, supra note 6, at 4.
84. Notice of Discovery, supra note 17, at 66.
85. The discussion of the International Law Commission surrounding the
adoption of article two of the Convention on the High Seas sheds some light
on what the Commission felt to be a reasonable use of the high seas. The
discussion shows it was the general view that no State has the right to "uti-
lize the high seas in a manner which unreasonably prevents other States
from enjoying that freedom." However, even fishing to some extent pre-
vents other States from enjoying the freedom to fish in the same area, yet
this was not considered to be unreasonable. [1956] 2 Y.B. IN'L L. CoMm'N
10, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser. A/1956/Add. 1 (1957).
86. McDougal & Schlei, Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective, 64 Y .r
L.J. 648 (1955).
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asserted the "least possible degree of authority" needed to accom-
plish the purpose, limited the claim both in area and in duration to
the minimum consistent with the purpose, chose an area that was
of "relatively slight importance" to international trade and fishing,
and the claim was for a "purpose much honored by world prescrip-
tion," the claim had much in favor of its being recognized.8 7
The theory of reasonable use, which developed from this article,
is that if the use proposed by a nation is reasonable and acquiesced
to by the international community, it is valid under international
law.8 It is the international community which is the final judge
of the reasonableness of the claim. But in its determination, the
community shall consider the factors involved in the claim and
urged by the claimant State as justification for its claim.8 9 In
the Norwegian Fisheries Case,90 for example, the international
community in considering Norway's claim to straight baselines and
later, Iceland's claim to extended fishing rights, considered the
economic dependence of the populations on the fishing grounds.
Where a prima facie case can be made that the use is reasonable
for both national interest and economic necessity, it is arguable that
the burden shifts to those who would oppose such a claim to show
that it is patently unreasonable, or unlawful.91 What the mining
industry must show to establish a prima facie case is an economic
analysis showing that the mining simply cannot take place (at least
under free enterprise concepts) unless exclusivity of tenure is
secured. In short, a company such as Deepsea, must demonstrate
that in order to free the risk capital, exclusivity is absolutely
required. If that can be shown, then it can be argued that ex-
clusivity is part of the reasonable use being made of the high seas
87. Id. at 661-74, 686.
88. Cases and legislation which support this finding include Church v.
Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187 (1804), in which the United States Supreme
Court, using a criterion of reasonableness, accepted the notion that nations
may exercise jurisdiction beyond the territorial waters in order to prevent
the violation of customs laws; the Hovering Acts of Great Britain also
asserted the same right. H.A. SmITH, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF =E SEA
27 (1950). The U.S. Anti-Smuggling Act of 1935, 19 U.S.C. § 1701 (1952),
also asserted the right of the United States to exercise jurisdiction beyond
the territorial waters to prevent violation of United States' customs laws.
89. McDougal & Schlei, supra note 86, at 660-61.
90. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. 116.
91. H.A. SMrnfi, TuE LAW AND CusToM OF THE SEm 29 (1950).
for the purpose of mining deep seabed mineral resources under the
freedom of the seas doctrine and the theory of reasonable use of
the high seas. However, the legal validity of that claim would still
seem to rest with the reaction of the international ,community and
whether the claim is recognized in the customary international law
process.92
There would seem to be sufficient facts available to present a
prima facie case for the reasonableness of exclusivity of tenure.
Apart from exclusive rights there is only intra-industry discipline
to insure that the returns from exploration accrue to the discoverer.
While industry leaders93 suggest that this discipline is strong, if
it were not, one company could wait until another had done the
needed exploration and then, having avoided these costs, move in
on the deposit and operate in the same locale. Moreover, the
tendency to mine as fast as possible and to mine only patches of
high-grade minerals would be aggravated by the need to reap the
benefits of mining before another firm obtained them.94
There are aspects of deep-sea mining which make critical the need
for strong intra-industry discipline, if not exclusive rights as well,
to make investment secure and to make private insurance available
to the miner if government insurance is not.
There are fifteen or so factors or characteristics of a deposit of
manganese nodules which have a bearing on the economics of min-
ing the deposit .... Before any mining operation ensues, there-
fore, the miner will explore the ocean for several deposits, study
those that appear to be capable of yielding the most profit and
design his mining system with those nodules in mind. Before he
starts to build his mining system, then, the miner will have a sub-
stantial capital investment in the deposit. .... 95
While there may be a prima facie case for the need of exclusivity
of tenure, in international convention law as in international custo-
mary law, the final judge of the reasonableness and legality of
Deepsea's claim rests with the international community. To date
there have been four responses to Deepsea's claim. All four have
rejected the claim.96 It can be expected that the Group of 77 de-
92. Letter from Professor H. Gary Knight to R. Sebastian Gibson, Sept.
29, 1975.
93. Interview with Dr. J. Mero, President of Ocean Resources, Inc., in
La Jolla, California, Sept. 17, 1975.
94. .Brooks, Deep Sea Manganese Nodules: From Scientific Phenomenon
to World Resource, in Tnm LAw or =nE SEA: Tan FUTURE or T=E SEA'S RE-
souRcEs 37 (Proceedings of the Second Annual Conference of the Law of
the Sea Institute, 1967).
95. J. MEno, TnE NbsmuL REsOURCES or THE SEA 291-92 (1965).
96. The four responses to Deepsea's claim have been from the United
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veloping countries which have pressed hard for an international
regime with complete authority over -the seabed will not recognize
Deepsea's claim either. Because of this absence of support for
Deepsea's claim of exclusive rights, the claim must fail under inter-
national law. Deepsea may exploit manganese nodules in the high
seas under international customary law and as a freedom of the
high seas without the acquiescence of -the international community.
However, it will require the support of the other States to make a
valid claim to exclusive rights of exploitation to an area of the
seabed.
FACTORS AFFECTING UNITED STATES GovERIwr
POLICY ToWARD DEEP-SEA MINING
The Common Heritage of Mankind Concept
In 1969 and 1970, an important resolution and an even more
important declaration were passed in the United Nations General
Assembly. The legal effect of these two instruments is critical to
the formulation of United States government policy toward deep-
sea mining and hence recognition of Deepsea's claim.
The 1969 Moratorium Resolution 97 provides that States and per-
sons are bound to refrain from all activities of exploitation of the
seabed and subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. The
United States, as well as most developed countries, voted against
the resolution and is not bound by it.
However, in 1970, the General Assembly passed the Declaration
of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor 98 without a
dissenting vote. This Declaration proclaims the resources of the
seabed and subsoil of the ocean floor beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction to be the common heritage of mankind. 99
States, see text accompanying note 84 supra; Canada, 14 INT'I LEGAL MATE-
RmT~s 67 (1975); Australia, id.at 795, and Great Britain, id. at 796.
97. G.A. Res. 2574 D, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/7630
(1969). This resolution was passed by a vote of 62 to 28 with 28 absten-
tions.
98. Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean
Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction,
,G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8097 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Declaration of Principles]. This declaration was
passed by a vote of 108 to 0 with 14 abstentions.
99. The Decalaration of Principles provides in part:
The binding effect of these resolutions on the United States can
be determined by a close study of the provisions of articles ten
through 14 and article 55 of the Charter of the United Nations.
These articles merely confer on the General Assembly the power to
pass recommendatory resolutions. Because the General Assembly
is not vested with a general legislative power, its resolutions, such
as the 1969 Moratorium Resolution, and its Declarations, such as
the 1970 Declaration of Principles, cannot legally bind its members,
except where the resolutions concern minor internal "housekeeping"
matters such as rules of procedure and the budget.100
Despite well-established views on the recommendatory effect of
General Assembly resolutions (or declarations), there has been sug-
gested in international law a theory of instantaneous, international
customary law.10 1
Traditionally, two elements have been considered to be required
in international customary law: 1) a usage of the law by the States
(known as the usage element) and 2) the opinio juris of States
that there is such a rule and that it must be obeyed. Professor
Cheng, however, found that international law requires only one
single constitutive element, namely, the opinio juris of the States.
The rationale of arguing opinio juris to be the essence of interna-
tional customary law is that the rules of international law ulti-
mately rest on the consent of States.102
The General Assembly... [s]olemnly declares that:
1. The sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the
area), as well as the resources of the area, are the common heritage
of mankind.
2. The area shall not be subject to appropriation by any means
by States or persons, natural or judicial, and no State shall claim
or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part thereof.
3. No State or person, natural or juridical, shall claim, exercise
or acquire rights with respect to the area or its resources incompat-
ible with the international regime to be established and the princi-
ples of this Declaration. Id.
100. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion on Voting Procedure, [1955] I.C.J. 67;
W. BIsHoP, supra note 55, at 48-49; I. BRowNur_ PRINcInLES or PuBLIC INTER-
NATiONAL LAW 14-15 (2d ed. 1973); D. O'CoNNELL, supra note 42, at 26-
28; M. SonENSEN, supra note 56, at 160-61 (1968); testimony of John R.
Stevenson, the Legal Adviser to the Department of State, in Hearings on
Issues Related to Establishment of Seaward Boundary of United States
Outer Continental Shelf Before the Special Subcomm. on the Outer Con-
tinental Shelf of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., at 210 (1970).
101. This theory was set forth in an article by Professor Bin Cheng in
which he analyzed whether the United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space
could be considered instant international customary law. Cheng, United
Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: Instant International Customary
Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 23 (1965).
102. Id. at 37.
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The Asylum Case'0 3 and the Right of Passage Case'04 have
shown that it is possible for such opinio juris to exist among
a limited number of States or even between only two States. Thus,
it follows that there is no reason why an opinio juris communis
may not arise in a very short period of time or even instantaneously
among all of the Members of the United Nations who declare their
opinio juris communis in a resolution or declaration. 0 5
In his article, Professor Cheng stated that while a resolution of
the General Assembly is without binding force, it can provide
strong evidence that the law which it states is a rule of customary
international law among the States voting for it. Where the vote
is unanimous as was the vote for the 1970 Declaration of Principles
(except for 14 abstentions), this would appear to create an almost
irrefutable presumption that the Declaration reflects a rule of
international customary law. If such an instrument instantane-
ously creates a rule of customary international law, nations cannot
by later changing their minds, individually opt out of the cus-
tomary rule with any effect on their obligation until a majority
of the States do likewise. However, it is clear that for such an
instrument to have the legal effect of international customary law,
the States must have considered themselves bound by the rule
when they voted for it. 10 6
In determining the binding effect of such a declaration as the
1970 Declaration of Principles, much depends on the level of
abstraction at which the Declaration is formulated. As a general
rule, it may be stated that precise and unambiguous provisions are
more likely to create international law than highly abstract or gen-
eral propositions. 10 7  Unfortunately, it is at this latter level of
high abstraction that many of the Declaration's principles were
103. [1950] I.C.J. 266.
104. [1961] I.C.J. 6.
105. Cheng, supra note 101, at 37.
106. Brown, The Consequences of Nonagreement, in THE LAW OF THE SEA:
A NEW GENEVA CONFERENCE 5-6 (Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Confer-
ence of the Law of the Sea Institute, 1971). Professor Brown has stated:
There is, however, no reason why a General Assembly resolution
should not provide the vehicle through which binding obligations
are created .... It is always a question of interpreting the intent
of the States concerned in accordance with the criteria of good faith
and reasonableness. Id.
107. Id. at 6.
formulated. Moreover, the fact that 14 States abstained and that
many others made statements on the unbinding effect of the
Declaration gives caution to attributing to it any law-creating
effect. 08
Mr. Amerasinghe, Chairman of the 1973 Seabed Committee said
in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, "[t]he
Declaration cannot claim the binding force of a treaty internation-
ally negotiated and accepted . . ."09 When the Soviet dele-
gation announced it would abstain from the vote on the Declaration
in the First Committee, it stressed that "naturally, approval by the
General Assembly of this draft cannot impose legal consequences
on States since such decisions are merely of a recommendatory
character.""10
The majority of those States voting in favor of the. Declaration
were of the same mind in limiting the significance of the Declara-
tion. The United Kingdom delegation, for example, expressed two
general reservations. The first was that the Declaration, like any
other resolution of the General Assembly, would have in itself no
binding force. The second reservation was that the Declaration
must be interpreted as a whole, and that as a whole it has no dis-
positive effect until there is agreement on an international re-
gime."'
108. Id.
109. U.N. Doc. A/PV./1933, at 100 (1970).
110. U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1798, at 32 (1970).
111. U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1799, at 5 (1970). Mr. Galindo Pohl (El Salva-
dor), who played an important part in the preparatory work preceding the
adoption of the Declaration, also confirmed that in the informal negotiations
prior to the adoption of the final compromise text, the Declaration was
clearly understood as not providing a provisional regime pending the con-
clusion of a definitive conventional regime. He added, however, that "those
who support it must obviously be deemed to be prepared to abide by its
content in good faith and to ensure that the regime will be consistent with
those principles." U.N. Doc. A/C.1IPV.1781, at 11-12 (1970). Because of
the ambiguity of the Declaration, such an obligation has little significance.
What appears to be an accurate description of the general attitude toward
the Declaration's obligations was given by Sir Laurence McIntyre (Aus-
tralia) when he espoused his country's understanding of the principles as
"general guidelines for the establishment of a regime for the sea-bed and
as an earnest desire of the great majority of members to have a regime;
but we would not see them as having any binding or mandatory effect upon
States in the meantime." U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1777, at 27 (1970).
See also Brown, supra note 106, at 7, quoting similar statements by
inter alia, Canada ("balanced and comprehensive enough to serve as the
foundation and framework for an international regime"); Norway (the prin-
ciples "are indications . . .of the rules and the provisions of international
law .... To make them applicable and enforceable . . .we shall later
have to hammer out detailed legal provisions."); and Peru ("only a basis
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The key phrase involved, "the common heritage of mankind," was
considered by many States to be without any clear judicial signifi-
cance. Nevertheless, the concept was felt to represent a "moral
and political complex of great value."11
The most reasonable conclusion from an exhaustive study of the
Declaration and comments made by various State spokesmen and
delegates would be that the concept of the common heritage of
mankind is not a legal principle. Rather, it embraces a moral
commitment by the international community to attempt to create
in good faith an international regime for the regulation of seabed
resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 113
The United States State Department's position with respect to the
effect of the 1970 Declaration of Principles upon deep seabed ex-
ploitation was explained by the Honorable John Norton Moore in
his legal capacity as Chairman, National Security Council Inter-
agency Task Force on Law of the Sea, as follows:
While we support the U.N. General Assembly's unanimous dec-
laration that the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction
is the common heritage of mankind, we believe neither that title
to the deep seabed or its resources is held by the world community,
nor that title to any area of the deep seabed or its resources belongs
to any state." 4
It can be concluded that the United States is not legally bound
by the Declaration of Principles to prevent Deepsea or any other
company from continuing with its exploration or exploitation plans.
However, there are many other considerations involved in the
formulation of United States policy toward deep-sea mining and
the decision whether to give explicit support to mining operations
through domestic legislation.
National Security and Domestic Considerations
Because of the national security interests at stake in the law
of the sea negotiations, the United States State Department is
for the preparation of a regime and must not be interpreted as an interim
regime").
112. Statement by Mr. Debergh (Belgium), U.N. Doc. A/C.l/PV.1788,
at 24-25 (1970).
113. See Brown, supra note 106, at 18.
114. Hearings on Amendment No. 946 to S. 1134, supra note 2, at 989.
See also id. at 994.
hesitant to support any claim such as that of Deepsea's or to pass
any legislation on seabed mining which may endanger the success
of the negotiations. The importance of naval mobility to the effec-
tiveness of the deterrent power of the United States' nuclear-armed
submarine fleet and surface vessels places the interest of freedom
of movement in the oceans high on the United States' list of
priorities in its formulation of policy toward seabed mining."65
Hence, one finds that the position of the Department of Defense
(whose interests lie purely in national defense) is that it is perfectly
willing to allow the developing countries to have total control of
seabed mining if that is the price necessary for securing agreement
on unrestricted passage through international straits and limita-
tions on the control by coastal States in the exclusive economic
zone concept being negotiated.":6
However, there lies a further national security interest in ensur-
ing that the United States will continue to have adequate sources
of all strategic minerals. 17  Consequently, in view of the power
which is being so effectively wielded by the developing oil nations
of the Middle East, it is not in the best interests of the United States
to have complete control of the seabed in an international authority
which could restrict United States access to the abundant supply
of minerals on the ocean floor. Therein lies a major consideration
behind United States policy today to seek the creation of an inter-
national regime which will guarantee nondiscriminatory access to
the resources of the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion.
United States import figures show that of the four most common
minerals found in manganese nodules, the United States imports
95 percent of its manganese, 98 percent of its cobalt, 74 percent
of its nickel and 18 percent of its copper." 8 Studies of the
countries which export these minerals indicate that some of them
indeed have the potential for the development of unfavorable atti-
tudes with respect to the exporting of their minerals to the United
States." 9 This is particularly true in the case of the Council of
115. E.D. BRowN, supra note 18, at 108-09.
116. Letter from Professor H. Gary Knight to R. Sebastian Gibson, Oct.
22, 1975.
117. See Hearings on Amendment No. 946 to S. 1134, supra note 2, at
800, 815, 818.
118. Statement of Dr. Robert A. Kilmarx, in id. at 892, 896. The major
foreign sources for these minerals are manganese: Brazil, Gabon, South
Africa, and Zaire; cobalt: Zaire, Belgium, Luxembourg, Finland, Canada,
and Norway; nickel: Canada and Norway; copper: Peru, and Chile. Id.
at 794.
119. See statement of Dr. Kilmarx, id., at 907, 912.
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Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC) which controls over 80
percent of the world exports of copper.120  While the United
States has in the past had sufficient domestic supplies of copper
to satisfy its needs, the Department of Interior projects that in 1985,
copper consumption in the United States will increase by about
1,400,000 tons, requiring a large increase in the percentage of copper
the United States presently imports.1 21
The United States must also consider the interests of national
mineral companies such as Deepsea which have developed the tech-
nology to exploit a new source of these minerals and hence make
the United States less dependent on mineral imports. The predomi-
nant interest of mining companies is in seeing that their investments
in deep-sea mining operations are made secure either through an
international regime or domestic legislation which will provide an
orderly administration of seabed mining and protect their
claims.122
If an international regime is established, these companies would
not wish the regime to have the power to limit particular States
to particular areas of the ocean floor or the power to limit the size
of a particular State's holding, for example, by setting a cumulative
total limit on the holdings of companies registered in one State.
Nor would companies wish the seabed authority to protect the ex-
port market of underdeveloped States producing specific metals by
limiting, for example, the annual production of that metal from
deep-sea mining operations. 12 3
Companies of the United States are also concerned with pro-
tecting the technological lead they hold over foreign mining com-
panies.124 In light of the slow rate of progress in the Law of
120. See Hearings on Amendment No. 946 to S. 1134, supra note 2, at 800,
804.
121. Id. at 796.
122. Address by John E. Flipse, President, Deepsea Ventures, Inc., Ocean
75 Conference, in San Diego, California, Sept. 22, 1975.
123. E.D. BROWN, supra note 18, at 108.
124. Address by Leigh S. Ratiner, Administrator, Ocean Mining Admin-
istration, Department of the Interior, before the American Mining Congress,
San Francisco, Cal., Oct. 1, 1975.
There are three patented method, being experimented with today for
mining nodules: continuous path dredging, fixed area dredging and contin-
uous line bucket dredging.
the Sea negotiations for the creation of an international regime,
Congress has recognized the desire of mining companies to begin
mining operations and has drafted legislation 125 which would
allow such operations to begin and regulate seabed exploitation by
United States companies.
Whether such legislation will be enacted depends much on
whether the State Department and the President feel such legisla-
tion can be implemented in a manner which does not put the United
States in the position of preempting the law of the sea treaty
negotiations.12  It also depends upon an evaluation of the
progress of the negotiations to date, and upon the progress that
is made at the third session of the United Nations Conference in
New York.
THE LAW OF THE SEA NEGOTIATIONS
The second substantive session of the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea held in Geneva from March 17
to May 9, 1975, achieved little progress in the negotiations for the
creation of an international regime to regulate the seabed and sub-
The method of continuous path dredging involves the use of a pneumatic
lift which acts similar to that of a huge vacuum cleaner. A dredgehead
connected by conduit to a ship moves just above the ocean flood in the same
pattern as the movement of the ship. If working up to maximum efficiency,
the system is meant to plow near-perfect rows by television or sonar. This
system was designed by Deepsea Ventures, Inc.
Fixed area dredging employs a stationary surface ship, a collection device
having a central base that remains stationary on the ocean floor, and a ro-
tating arm attached to the base with a movable carriage which moves in
and out along the arm and acts as a dredge. Nodules are then crushed
within the base and then pumped up the conduit to a barge submerged be-
neath the surface ship. When most of the nodules lying within the radius
of the base have been collected, the entire system and ship are moved to
another area to begin the process again. This system is owned by Summa
Corp.
The third method, continuous line bucket dredging, employs a line to
which specially designed dredge buckets are attached at regular intervals.
The line forms a loop that passes through the ship's bow and stern and
reaches to the ocean floor. By rotating the line through the loop and mov-
ing the ship laterally, the buckets are dragged across the bottom in a path
traced by the ship's movement and continuously dumped into the ship's
hold. The advantage of this system is the relatively small capital invest-
ment of $10 million needed to begin processing nodules at a level of about
300,000 tons per year. This system is patented in Japan, and American
rights are held by Ocean Resources, Inc. Eckert, Exploitation of Deep
Ocean Minerals: Regulatory Mechanisms and United States Policy, 17 J.
LAw & EcoN. 143, 147-48 (1974).
125. The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Bill, S. 713, 94th Cong.,
lst Sess. (1975).
126. Testimony, supra note 6, at 6.
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soil of the ocean floor. Agreement was reached to hold a third
substantive session of eight weeks in New York; this session is
scheduled to commence at the end of March, 1976. It was also
recommended that the General Assembly provide for an additional
substantive session in the summer of 1976 if the upcoming confer-
ence so decides. 127
It was not until the Geneva session appeared to be headed toward
failure that the chairmen of the three main comnmittees were
requested to prepare separate texts for an Informal Single
Negotiating Text128 to aid negotiations in the interim period
between conferences. 129 However, the utility of the three parts
within the Negotiating Text for this purpose varies considerably,
reflecting the different extent to which the respective authors
adhered to the Conference President's admonition to "take account
of the formal and informal discussions held so far."' 30
Part one of the Informal Single Negotiating Text which is
concerned with the regime and machinery for the seabed beyond
national jurisdiction, is completely imbalanced in favor of the
developing countries. It states the proposals of the Group of 77
but fails to reflect either the proposals or the interests of the United
States and other developed countries. As Senator Metcalf has
commented,
[f]rom the point of view of the United States, the kindest words
I've heard about Part One of the text is that it is an "unmitigated
disaster . .. "
During previous hearings, we have talked about brackets (the
language about which there was a question) and alternative texts
in treaty drafts. As I read the single text, the brackets are gone.
The alternative texts are gone. The interests of the United States
are gone.
127. Statement of John R. Stevenson, Former Chief, United States Dele-
gation to the Geneva Session of the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, in Hearings on Status Report on Law of the Sea Con-
ference Before the Subcomm. on Minerals, Materials and Fuels of the Senate
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1170(1975).
128. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8 (1975).
129. For a more complete history of the drafting of Part I of the Informal
Single Negotiating Text, see Statement of Leigh S. Ratiner, Administrator,
Ocean Mining Administration, Department of the Interior, in Hearings on
Status Report, supra note 127, at 1190-91.
130. Statement of John R. Stevenson in id. at 1171.
My problem is that I've read the single text. The single text may
not be a negotiated document. But it is a measure of sorts of the
effectiveness of our negotiators in getting our point of view
prominently displayed before the Conference. It would appear that
we're in bad trouble.'13
Indeed, it is highly questionable whether part one of the Text can
even serve as a basis for negotiations. 3 2
There have been three main points in the negotiations for an
international seabed authority in which there have been no signs
of progress in the past, nor any signs of progress for the future.
First, the developing countries as a group hold intransigent views
,on the question of whether the International Seabed Authority
should be empowered to exploit the whole of the ocean floor to
the exclusion of States and private companies. They have stated
in negotiations that the Authority must have this power. The
United States has said it should not have this power.13 3 Second, the
developing countries hold with almost equal vigor the view that
decisions on the actions of the Authority must be made under the
procedure of a one-nation, one-vote assembly. Because the develop-
ing countries far outnumber the developed countries, the United
States cannot agree to this approach.13 4  Third, the developing
countries insist that if the Authority contracts with a State or
private company to exploit the seabed, the Authority must be
almost entirely free to dictate the terms and conditions of contract,
particularly those relating to the transfer of technology and profits.
The United States refuses to agree to this view as well. 35 These
three points are the absolute minimum the developing countries
believe they must achieve to insure their control over the raw
materials of the seabed. 3 6 These are also likely to cause failure of
the negotiations.
The United States has repeatedly committed itself to seeking an
authority which assures guaranteed nondiscriminatory access under
reasonable conditions to the ocean's seabed minerals. If the
Authority has the power to restrict the number of areas available
for commercial development and to select among applicants seeking
to mine the seabed, the United States cannot support the
Authority. 3"
131. Statement of Senator Lee Metcalf, Chairman of the Senate Subcom-
mittee on Minerals, Materials and Fuels, in id. at 1162-63.
132. See statement of John R. Stevenson, in id. at 1171.




137. See statement of Hon. John Norton Moore, in id. at 1177.
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The stalemate of the negotiations is basically the result of two
diverse views. On the one hand, industrialized nations, acutely
aware of their growing dependence on imports of raw material
supplies, feel they cannot be expected to agree to surrender their
rights of access to an abundant supply of minerals in an area com-
prising two-thirds of the Earth's surface, to a system in which an
international authority could limit or exclude their access. The
developing countries, on the other hand, wish to secure their share
of this area which has been proclaimed to be the common heritage
of mankind, so they may improve their economic well-being.
138
While part one of the Text does not represent the negotiations
which have taken place so far, it does represent a step toward fail-
ure in the negotiations. The inability to make significant progress
in the negotiations for the creation of a seabed regime in the last
year has greatly increased the likelihood that nations will begin
to make unilateral claims of 200-mile fishing rights and deep-sea
mining rights to protect their own interests.
139
A good example of this is the case of the United States. On
October 9, 1975, by a vote of 208 to 101, the House of Representa-
tives passed the Marine Fisheries Conservation Act 140 which
extends America's fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles from the
coast.141 It is likely that the Senate will soon pass a similar
bill' 42 by a majority in excess of two to one also. Passage and
signature of the 200-mile fishing bill would be a great boost to the
proponents of the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Bill
143
and might prompt the bill's adoption.'
44
At the same time, informal negotiations were held before the Law
of the Sea Conference in New York,145 and the United States is con-
138. Pinto, Problems of Developing States and Their Effects on Decisions
on Law of the Sea, in THE LAw OF THE SEA: NEEDS AND INTEREsTs OF DE-
VELOPING CouNTRIs 3, 13 (Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Conference
of the Law of the Sea Institute, 1972).
139. See Clausen, Little Hope for World Accord: We Should Move, L.A.
Times, Nov. 2, 1975, § 6, at 5, col 1.
140. H.R. 200, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1975).
141. Krueger, Why Sea Negotiations Take So Long, L.A. Times, Nov. 2,
1975, § 6, at 5, col. 1.
142. S. 961, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
143. S. 713, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
144. Krueger, supra note 141.
145. Testimony, supra note 6, at 3.
tinuing to make concessions to the demands of the developing coun-
tries. For example, in a speech 146 before the American Bar Associa-
tion Annual Convention in Montreal on August 11, 1975, Secretary
of State, Henry Kissinger, stated that the United States is willing
to adopt a mixed system of jurisdiction which would allow for ex-
ploitation both by the international agency itself and by States or
companies operating pursuant to licenses granted by the seabed au-
thority. 147  However, it is doubtful that such concessions will do
much to offset the harm to the negotiations caused by unilateral
claims such -as that of the United States to jurisdiction over a 200-
mile fishing zone. In the case of deep-sea mining, there has been
so little progress in the negotiations, interim legislation seems in-
evitable.
CONCLUSION
If the negotiations fail or if the oceans treaty is concluded but
not subscribed to by a sufficient number of States to make the con-
vention representative of international customary law, deep-sea
mining will develop under international customary law and the
domestic legislation passed by States. The free-market economic
system operating under international customary law would prob-
ably give greater benefits in terms of long-term economic stability,
and cheaper sources of minerals than would be gained in profits
from an international regime restricting seabed exploitation.148
146. Speech by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger before the Ameri-
can Bar Association Annual Convention, Montreal, Canada, Dep't of State
Release No. 408 (Aug. 11, 1975).
147. Id. at 4. Secretary Kissinger stated in part:
The United States has devoted much thought and consideration
to this issue. We offer the following proposals:
An international organization should be created to set rules for
deep seabed mining.
This international organization must preserve the rights of all
countries and their citizens directly to exploit deep seabed re-
sources.
It should also insure fair adjudication of conflicting interests and
security of investment.
Countries and their enterprises mining deep seabed resources
should pay an agreed portion of their revenues to the international
organization, to be used for the benefit of developing countries.
The management of the organization and its voting procedures
must reflect and balance the interests of the participating states.
The organization should not have the power to control prices or
production rates.
If these essential U.S. interests are guaranteed, we can agree that
this organization will also have the right to conduct mining opera-
tions on behalf of the international community primarily for the
benefit of developing countries.
148. See generally letter, supra note 116.
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However, it would be better for all concerned if the same open
access environment for deep-sea mining could be agreed upon in
a comprehensive oceans treaty with provisions to cover other dis-
puted areas in law of the sea as well. One must not lose sight
of what is at stake in the negotiations for the treaty. There exists
today the opportunity to create a treaty which could prevent dis-
putes over the continental shelf, fishing rights and deep-sea mining,
and act as a cornerstone in the legal and political development of
the world community.
In times when numerous nations face widespread famine and
malnutrition, fish have become an increasingly vital source of food.
Unless competitive practices are soon harmonized and fish harvest-
ing managed within certain limits, the world faces the prospect of
mounting conflict for this important source of protein.149
In a world of vast ideological differences between nations holding
the greatest destructive power in the history of mankind, the need
for cooperation rather than confrontation has never been stronger.
This can be learned from a story told by the Honorable John
Norton Moore, Chairman of the National Security Council Inter-
agency Task Force on the Law of the Sea:
The fundamental choice between conflict and co-operation is, I
think, brought home dramatically by the story of the young lady
and the young man who approach each other from different direc-
tions at a traffic light. They stop, the lady rolls down the window,
leans out and shouts at him, "Pig." He is much taken aback by
this, rolls down his window and shouts, "Cow." The light turns
green, he proceeds around the next curve, and runs into a large
pig which is squarely in the middle of the road (laughter). The
moral, of course, is that co-operation is preferable to confron-
tation.15 0
149. Speech, supra note 146, at 3.
150. Moore, The Functional Approach and the Law of the Sea, in PER-
SPECTIVES ON OcEAK PoLIcY 421 (1974). See generally Gibson, Products Li-
ability in the United States and England: the Difference and Why 3
ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 493, 516-22 (1974).
Dr. Pinto has stated the case for cooperation in this way:
There is no government among us so cynical and so corrupt that
it does not strive genuinely, but within the limits imposed by his-
tory and social forces, to achieve the best for its people. Negotiators
on the law of the sea, whether from the developed or the develop-
ing countries, will be doing just that in the months ahead. The
efforts to reconcile the demands of the developed with those of the
developing countries, and individual or group interests with those
of the community, will take all the statesmanship of which our rep-
The politics of ideological confrontation and strident nationalism
must not be allowed to become pervasive, or broad and humane
international agreement will grow ever more elusive and unilateral
actions will dominate. Whither then of the Great Nodule Spec-
tacle? In an environment of widening chaos, the stronger may
survive and be heard to prosper temporarily. But the weaker may
despair and the human spirit will suffer.
R. SE3ASTIAN GIBsoi
resentatives are capable. Nothing will be achieved by treating the
developing countries as incompetent, feckless eternal mendicants;
as little will be accomplished by treating the developed countries as
power-hungry imperialists whose every action must arouse suspi-
cian [sic]. For let us make no mistake, the one group can no
longer ignore the other, and it will take both to make the system-
any system-work. It is only through goodwill and patience on
both sides and a genuine understanding of each other's problems
that we can hope to succeed. Pinto, supra note 138, at 13.
